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I ntrod uction 
The last five years have revealed concerns 
about the appropriateness of Revenue powers. 
Broadly speaking, these concerns emphasise 
either the appropriateness of Revenue powers 
for securing the revenue of the State, or the lack 
of safeguards on Revenue powers to protect the 
rights of the taxpayer. It is the emphasis that 
is important because disagreement revolves 
around the appropriate balance between the 
need to secure the revenue of the State and the 
rights of the taxpayer. 
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In what follows, we present some of the' 
implicit and explicit concerns about the 
current balance between Revenue powers and 
safeguards for the taxpayer. We then outline 
the broader legal and economic context. In 
doing so, we demonstrate that the underlying 
forces for change are encouraging increases 
in Revenue powers. Finally, we argue that it 
is logically inconsistent in both principle and 
practice to increase Revenue powers without 
appropriate safeguards. 
Recent Concerns 
The extent and level of tax evasion uncovered 
around the turn of the century raised issues 
about the appropriateness of Revenue powers. 
In February 2002, the then Attorney-General, 
Michael McDowell SC, requested that the Law 
Reform Commission consider the establishment 
of a Fiscal Prosecutor and a Revenue Court. In 
March 2003, the then Minister for Finance, Charlie 
McCreevy, established the Revenue Powers Group 
to advise Government on issues related to the 
powers available to the Revenue Commissioners. 
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In terms of the balance between securing make it to the Act. There was an increase in the Revenue. In 2005, the Revenue Commissioners 
the revenue of the State and the rights of the 
taxpayer, the main recommendations of both the 
Law Reform Commission (LRC) and the Revenue 
Powers Group (RPG) imply a need to rebalance 
publication limits for settlement from €12,700 to collected €l1,339m from income taxation. 
€30,OOO. There was a reduction in the interest Included in the income tax figures is €537m 
on overdue tax to 10% APR. There from Revenue Special 
in favour of the taxpayer. The LRC recommended 
against setting up a separate Revenue Court and 
against setting up an office of Fiscal Prosecutor. 
It did recommend clarifying and extending the 
powers of the Appeals Commissioner. ' 
was a reduction in the (rarely used) 
penalty for fraud from 200% to 
100%. However, these represent 
relaxation in the penalties and do 
not constitute safeguards on the 
use of Revenue power. ' 
"The cumulative effect 
of the normalising 
Investigations, which 
means that 4.74% 
of income tax came 
from this source. 
The RPG concluded that the powers of 
Revenue were similar to other jurisdictions, 
and it accepted the need for such powers, 
provided adequate statutory safeguards were 
introduced . Like the LRC, the RPG recommended 
the inclusion of additional appeals provisions. 
It also recommended: new objective 
preconditions for the use of some of the more 
By contrast, in terms of securing 
the revenue of the State, additional 
powers were given to Revenue in 
the Act. There was an extension to 
the offences that can be criminally 
prosecuted. In particular, it 
extends the "aid ing and abetting" 
provisions. It also widens the 
of 'extraordinary' 
Revenue powers 
designed for the 
special investigations 
tends to tilt the 
balance towards 
securing the revenue 
of the State." 
The majority of the 
yield from special 
investigations came 
from an investigation 
into holders of single 
premium insurance 
policies, based on 
powers introduced in 
Finance Act 2005. 
It seems that 
special Revenue 
investigations are 
intrusive powers; new safeguards on the circumstances in which directors 
search for, and removal of, records; legislating and other officers of a company 
for a number of areas in which Revenue has can be criminally prosecuted. And Revenue was 
developed a system of practice under the power also given a new power to facilitate its proposed 
to mitigate; and changes in regard to access to Insurance Tax Fraud Inquiry. 
third -party information . 
One member of the RPG, Julie 
Burke, citing supporting judgments 
from the case In the matter of 
GO'C and AO'C,' has claimed that 
statutory safeguards are virtually 
non-existent and that "to the extent 
that any safeguards exist, they are 
contained in Revenue Operations 
Manuals and are of questionable 
legal standing and offer little 
comfort to the taxpayer".' 
"Based on subsequent 
legislative action, 
it would seem that 
legislators were not 
convinced by the LRC 
and the RPG on the 
substantive issues." 
The importance of 
special investigation 
powers, like that 
introduced for 
insurance tax fraud, 
can be gauged by an 
examination of the 
recent use of Revenue 
powers. The RPG 
accepted that the use 
of "normal" Revenue 
Based on subsequent legislative action, it would 
seem that legislators were not convinced by the 
LRC and the RPG on the substantive issues. A 
good example is the 2005 Finance Act. Some 
changes arising from the report of the RPG did 
powers in Ireland, like 
the powers themselves, is similar to international 
norms (although this raises the issue as to why 
there are no comparable safeguards) . 
However, the use of special investigations 
powers has produced exceptional audit yields for 
an important source of revenue for the State. 
The importance of these investigations can 
be seen if the total yield from some of these 
recent investigations is considered. These are 
presented in Table 1 on page 54 . 
The targeting of potentially large levels of tax 
evasion is to be welcomed . However, doing so 
by the use of special investigation powers has 
potential dangers. The cumulative effect of the 
normalising of "extraordinary" Revenue powers 
designed for the special investigations tends to 
tilt the balance towards securing the revenue of 
the State. 
There may also be a tendency to use Revenue 
powers to achieve aims for which they were not 
specifically designed. For example, it would 
seem that the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) has 
grown to rely more heavily on the power to tax 
rather than the powers it was granted to seize 
the assets of suspected criminals. Up to the end 
The lRC Report did recommend a nu mber of changes that would encourage taxpayers to comply with the prosecution process (see Gibbons. G., "l aw Reform Commission Report on a Fiscal Prosecutor 
and a Revenu e Court : An Ove rview", Irish Tox Review. 18/2 (2005): 1]6-179). 
In the matter o{GO 'C & AO "C lapplicatlan a{Liam Liston (lnspectaro{Ta .. sJl(I9961ITR 346 - Supreme Cou rt. 
J Bu rke. J •• "Revenu e Powers The Need ror Adequate Statutory Safeguards", Irish 10)( Review, 17/3 (2004): 252. 
• Although if should be noted that the Act limited Revenue's powers to enter a private dwelling wilhout a warrant to search for documents relating to PAVE and sub-contractors. 
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Table 1: Revenue Yield from Selected Special Investigations to End of 2005. € m. 
No. of Cases Tax Interest & Penalties Total 
Offshore Assets 13.651 368.3 
Ansbacher 289 14·3 
Bogus Non-Resident Not avai lable 329·9 
CMI - National Irish Bank 465 25.2 
Life Assurance Products 5.150 122.0 
[Source: Revenue Commissioners' Annual Report 20051 
Notes: 
1. Ansbacher total includes €IB.4m payment on account. 
2. eMI tota l includes €2. Bm in respect of capital gains tax. 
of 2005. CAB had demanded and collected over 
€ 80m in taxes whereas it had achieved Section 
3 Orders of approximately €30m.s One less than 
favourable interpretation of the use of Revenue 
powers by CAB is that it involves the State 
sharing the ill -gotten gains of criminals. " 
legal and Economic Context 
When one considers the evolution of Revenue 
powers over the last two decades. it is obvious that 
the t ide is flowing in favour of securing the revenue 
of the State. The various increases in Revenue 
powers have not brought about corresponding 
increases in the protection afforded to the 
taxpayer. Rather than increasing safeguards on the 
increased powers, a standard practice seems to 
be to grant a period of grace to the taxpayer to get 
their affairs in order - a popular coercive technique 
called an "amnesty", which is used to collect items 
as diverse as outstanding taxes and illegally held 
firearms. These amnesties offer little ongoing 
protection to the taxpayer. 
Putting these changes in context wou ld suggest 
that the direction of these changes is likely to 
Continue because the reasons driving them 
remain . The majority of the increased Revenue 
Powers introduced over the last two decades can 
be attributed to three causes: 
1. There were changes driven by changes in 
economic conditions and the manner in which 
business is conducted . 
2. There were changes in Revenue's power to 
combat serious crime. 
3. There was the introduction of Revenue 
powers to combat specific types of tax 
evasion, e.g., interest income tax evasion. 
It is informative to consider each of these three 
reasons in turn . It is less than 20 years since 
the movement to greater self-assessment in the 
tax system brought increased powers of audit 
for Revenue and the associated tax amnesty of 
1988. Four years later, there was an even more 
significant change in the economic environment 
. 
with the advent of the Single European Market. 
The associated removal of certain restraints 
on the movement of goods and cap ital had 
numerous implications. Jurisdictiona l integration 
resulted in changes to the taxation of interest 
income and Revenue powers designed to deal 
with the greater potential for money laundering 
facilitated by the freer movement of capital. The 
legislation associated with the commitment to 
the Single European Market included the Criminal 
Justice Act 1994. 
42 8.4 796·7 
23·1 55. 8 
504.3 834. 2 
28·5 56·9 
260.0 382 .0 
Within three years of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1994, Revenue powers had increased 
substantially as a result of efforts to combat 
crime . In a flurry of legislative activity following 
the murders of Veronica Guerin and Garda Jerry 
McCabe in the summer of 1996. the Proceeds 
of Crime Act 1996, the Criminal Assets Bureau 
Act 1996, and the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 
were introduced. We have already seen the 
implications of the subsequent interpretation 
and use of this legislation in terms of CAB's use 
of its Revenue powers. 
But there were other ways in which this 
legislation increased the powers of Revenue 
relative to the taxpayer. In terms of search and 
seizure powers alone, Chapter 4 of the TCA 1997 
provided : 
No preconditions for information-seeking 
powers; 
No independent review of Revenue's decision 
and no right to appeal; 
No requirement to notify the taxpayer of a 
court application; 
No requirement to first request the 
information from the taxpayer; 
~ A Section 3 Order prevents a person from dea li ng in any way with property that is the subject of the Order. It is termed an "Interlocutory order" and re~ains in place for up to seven years. It is granted 
by the (ourt once it is satisfied that. on a civil standard of proo f. a person is in possession or control of property that constitutes direct ly or ind irectly the proceeds of cr ime. 
6 Hunt. P .• "The Crimina l Assets Bureau and Taxa tion - Recent Developments'" Irish Tax Review. 14/6 (200 1) . 573·578. 
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No redress for damage; 
No time lim it on documents requested. 
Two features of this legislation are worth 
remembering. First, the hollowing out of the 
rights of the ind ividua l is a general 
potentia lly better so luti ons are ove rlooked. The conclusion. The vast majority of individuals 
case of interest income taxa ti on is an obvious agree that there needs to be limits on the use 
one. If one is to believe the agencies of the State, of power. However, under the surface of this 
then the reason for the differentia l t reatment perspective lies the conviction that constraints 
of resident and non-res ident inte rest income are only needed on others . Few seem to accept 
taxation (including the need for limits on their own power. It seems 
trend and not one limited to the 
taxation arena. For examp le, the 
Criminal Justice Act 1994 facilitated 
a wider interpretation of what 
exactly constituted the proceeds 
of crime post-conviction, and it 
reduced the burden of proof to 
the balance of probabilities from 
beyond reasonable doubt. The 
Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 further 
reduced the rights of the individual 
"The various increases 
in Revenue powers 
have not brought 
about corresponding 
increases in the 
protection afforded to 
the taxpayer." 
enforcement) was 
the threat to the Irish 
currency and the 
exchange rate.s Has 
the reason for the 
differential treatment 
of resident and non-
resident accounts 
disappeared with the 
Irish pound? Could 
not the differential 
it is easier to see the potential for the abuse of 
powers in others. 
Consistently Inconsistent Positions 
Legislators are no different in this regard. At the 
beginning of the 21st century, individuals are 
faced with economic incentives in virtually all 
aspects of their lives because legislators believe 
these incentives will influence the behaviour 
of citizens. Legislators be lieve that plastic bag 
levies will aid environmental efforts at recycling. 
They believe that the individualisation of the 
by allowing confiscation of property, believed by 
the Gardai to be the proceeds of crime, without a 
prior criminal conviction . 
The second feature of the legislation worth 
remembering is that such legislation introduced 
in times of perceived extraordinary need tends 
to become normalised with the passage of time. 
There are clear parallels between criminal law 
and tax law in this regard .' 
The third type of change in Revenue powers 
was driven by the need to combat specific tax 
evasion schemes such as DIRT, Ansbacher, and 
the Clerical Medical Insurance Scheme. The 
success of the resulting special investigations in 
terms of yield per investigation is presented in 
Table 1 on page 54. Given this success , it would 
be fair to assume that Revenue will continue to 
target areas where the potential for tax evasion 
remains greatest. 
It also seems fair to assume that legislation to 
facilitate the process will continue to make its 
way to the Statute Book and remain in place 
after the specific investigations have come and 
gone. In the rush to increase powers, alternative, 
treatment at the heart of the tax evasion be 
removed? 
The cumulative effect of all these changes in 
Revenue powers is to increase the potential to 
secure the revenue of the State 
tax system will encourage more labour·force 
participation. They believe that "sin" taxes on 
items like cigarettes and alcohol will reduce 
consumption. 
without having corresponding 
increases in the protection afforded 
to the taxpayer. Moreover, as 
this part of the article sought 
to demonstrate, the underlying 
reasons for the changes remain 
and it is therefore unlikely that the 
direction of change will be reversed. 
Another Case for 
Safeguards 
Ironically, there are parallel 
developments which suggest 
that logical consistency requires 
safeguarding the rights of the 
taxpayer. The plethora of tribunals 
"The cumulative effect 
of all these changes in 
Revenue powers is to 
increase the potential 
to secure the revenue 
of the State without 
having corresponding 
increases in the 
protection afforded to 
the taxpayer." 
Not only do legislators 
believe that incentives 
influence individua ls 
in their roles as private 
citizens, but they also 
believe that they will 
influence individuals 
in their public role. 
Legislators believe 
that doctors will 
operate a medical·card 
prescribing scheme 
more efficiently if 
they get some of 
the savings. They 
and investigations into various aspects of Irish 
life suggests few citizens believe that those in 
believe those in the 
education sector will devote more time and effort 
to research if the legislators allocate funds for 
"fourth -level" education. But the legislators do 
not believe that they themselves are influenced 
by political donations. 
positions of power use that power in the public 
interest all the time. Yet the implications of 
such a belief are rare ly followed to their logical 
-
The non-ju ry Special CrimIna l Court Is a case in point. Introduced in 1972 al the height or"the Troubles" to combat the threat posed by parami li tary intimidation of jurors. it has become normalised over 
time despite th(-' fac t that the para military threa t has abated . 
II According to the Governor of the Centra l Bank. M r Maurice O'Connell. in his evidence to the DIRT Investigation, the excha nge rate was "the plank wh ich kept us floating". 
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Nor are those legislators who deal with taxation 
matters any different. One Minister for Finance 
stated in his Budget speech that : 
" ... there is no such entity as 'the Revenue' 
in the sense of the enemy of the citizen. 
Every good citizen ought to poy his tax and 
there must be effective means of dealing 
with deliberate evasion or refusal to pay. 
Tax which one person escapes paying is not 
conveniently wiped out but is shifted on to 
the shoulders of his fellow-citizens. Refusal to 
damaged a Drug Squad investigation because of 
vested interests,'· and that senior Gardai believe 
that the Garda Siochana Act 2005 is open to abuse 
by a corrupt Government." It seems that Gardai 
recognise the potential for abuse of power by 
other public servants. 
Logical Consistency Requires 
Safeguards 
The above examples fit neatly into the body of 
theory called constitutional political economy. 
The theory derives from the work of 1986 Nobel 
pay amounts to contempt of the Oireachtos." 9 . Laureate James M. Buchanan, and it advocates 
Over three decades later, the same individual 
provided "the Revenue" with millions of pounds 
in settlement for evaded taxes. The Moriarty 
Tribunal will soon issue its findings. 
the need for constraints on those working in 
the public sector, e.g., politicians, bureaucrats, 
Revenue officials, lawyers and professors. It 
arrives at this conclusion from an application of 
the exchange principle to the politica l process. 
In 1999 the same individual successfully defended The presumption that ensures logical consistency 
in the Courts his constitutional right to privacy is that all individuals are moral equivalents 
over his financial records. It seems that the - everyone is self-interested and there are no 
individual acknowledged in practice 
that there is a conflict between the 
rights of the citizen and the rights 
of the State - a conflict that was not 
present in his earlier Budget speech. 
The list of other politicians revealed 
as having evaded interest income 
tax clearly indicates that such tax 
evasion was not limited to one 
person or one political party. It is a 
mistake to base tax law and Revenue 
powers on the presumption of 
superior moral beings formulating or 
implementing such law. 
"When the 
Government sought 
expert opinion on 
Revenue powers, 
superior moral beings 
operating in the public 
sector. 
While this is not the 
place to discuss 
the details of 
constitutional political 
economy, it is useful to 
note that it provides us 
with the fundam~ntal 
question we should 
ask when examining 
it was advised on 
the need for greater 
safeguards for the 
taxpayer." 
Given the nature of Revenue powers discussed 
here, one other example is worth noting. In his 
recent book about CAB, Paul Williams describes 
the suspicion that exists within An Garda 
Siochana about the interests and motivation of 
other agencies of the State and its legislators. 
For example, he suggests that Customs Officers 
, Cha rles J. Haughev. DaH Debales (II AprH I967l al 1279. 
tax law. In effect, 
constitutional political economy asks what form 
of social contract would be agreed among a group 
of self-interested individuals and, in particular, 
what agreement would be reached on taxation. 
The answer is that taxation powers would be 
delegated to some members of the group, and 
strict limits would be placed on the use of these 
powers. This is a close approximation to, and 
justification for, constitutional democracy. 
The reasoning behind this conclusion is pretty 
straightforward. Delegation is required because it 
would not be feasible to attempt to get agreement 
among the group every time revenue is required. 
Therefore, individuals would delegate the power 
to tax provided they believed that, on the whole, 
they would pay their "fair" share. To ensure that 
the delegated power was not abused, and that 
everyone paid their fair share, individuals would 
require constitutional safeguards on the use of 
tax powers. The safeguards are required because 
all individuals are moral equivalents in their self-
interest. There is a need to "guard the guards". 
Constitutional political economy neither claims 
that all individuals acfin a self-interested fashion 
nor that individuals behave in a self-interested 
fashion all the time. It acknowledges that this is an 
empirical matter. However, once one considers the 
possibility that individuals might behave in such 
a fashion, then powers should only be delegated 
when they are accompanied by appropriate 
safeguards. Increases in these powers should be 
accompanied by increases in safeguards. 
Conclusion 
When the Government sought expert opinion on 
Revenue powers, it was advised on the need for 
greater safeguards for the taxpayer. Julie Burke, 
Patrick Hunt and Lorna Gallagher have raised 
similar concerns about Revenue powers in the 
pages of the Irish Tox Review. In this article, we 
arrive at the same conclusions but by a different 
route. We argue that trends in the legal and 
economic environment mean that the balance 
of power is likely to shift further against the 
rights of the taxpayer. Further, in a constitutional 
democracy where the power to tax is a power 
delegated by the people, then logical consistency 
requires that the greater the powers are, the 
greater the safeguards that are needed. 
Williams. P .. The Untouchables: Ireland's Criminal Assets Bureau and its Woran Organised Crime (Dublin: Merlin Publishing, 2006): 44. 
" Ibid. at 226. 
